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RAYMOND J. HEILMAN
It is proposed to examine the method or methods of treatment
by courts in the United States of the question of the enforceabil-
ity of arbitration agreements in conflict of laws cases. The view
here taken is that the problem should be regarded and treated
as substantive-that it is substantive in any clear and workable
conception of the use of the term. This is not to deny that the
problem has procedural aspects but only to deny that it is solely
procedural. It may be worthwhile to inquire whether enforce-
ability has not in some instances been labelled a "procedural"
matter, and placed under the rule that "questions of procedure
are determined according to the Iex fori," in order to effect
the result which application of the rule of the forum would
bring about. It is submitted that the rules which are applied
to determine the validity or enforceability of the main agree-
ment to which the arbitration provision relates should be ap-
plied to determine the validity or enforceability of the ar-
bitration provision as well. This is the attitude taken by the
Englih courts, although its adoption by those courts may be
largely explained by the passage of the English Arbitration Act
of 1889, by which arbitration stipulations in domestic cases were
expressly declared valid and enforceable. In the United States,
on the other hand, it should be borne in mind that the courts
have in many instances, if not generally, taken an attitude of
hostility toward arbitration, considering arbitration in the tradi-
tional manner as tending to "oust them of jurisdiction" or as
usurping court functions.
The assertion that the domestic rule of the forum (ex foi)
should determine whether or not a stipulation for arbitration is
enforceable is often, if not usually, supported by a statement that
such a stipulation is procedural or remedial, with a negative
statement or implication that ,it is, therefore, not substantive.
The distinction between that which is regarded as "substantive"
and that which is regarded as "procedural" (or "remedial" or
"adjective") is thought by the writer to present merely a differ-
! In such a case it could perhaps be said that the question was labelled
"procedural" because it was felt to be "substantive," i. e., if it is accepted
that "Substantive law is concerned with the ends which the administration
of justice seeks, (while) procedural law deals with the means and instru-
ments by which those ends are to be attained." SAL.MOND. JUnISPRUDENCE
(6th ed. 1920) 438.
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ence of point of view in considering court action, or other
societal action, with respect to a factual situation. One may
consider such action primarily from the standpoint of the effect
of what is done, or from the standpoint of the act or series of
acts by which a certain effect is brought about. That is, it would
seem that the terms "substantive" and "procedural" merely sig-
nify different sides of court or other societal action, and not
generic differences between one type of societal action and
another. And it is believed that it will be found that in
most cases in which the distinction is drawn, it is made use
of as an expedient or device to reach or to explain a particular
conclusion or result. Whether or not arbitration be regarded
as a remedy, a rule providing that arbitration shall be required,
if stipulated for by the parties to a contract, causes certain legal
relations to exist, including a right-duty relation with respect
to the carrying out of the arbitration stipulation. Enforcement
of an arbitration agreement "... affects substance and not merely
procedure in that it determines the legal relations consequent
upon the operative facts ... .,,' 2 Furthermore, to the extent that
the arbitration agreed upon would treat of legal relations, en-
forcement of an agreement to arbitrate determines legal rela-
tions.3 Also, submission to arbitration according to the terms
of an agreement either may or may not constitute an operative
fact determining the existence of a legal remedy, and conse-
quently of one or more right-duty or other legal relations. It
does not seem plausible, therefore, to say that such subniission
is totally non-substantive, nor that a legal rule requiring such
submission is totally non-substantive.'
2 CORBIN, CASES ON CONTRACTS (1921) 1475n., referring to the statute
of frauds; cf. Lorenzen, The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws
(1923) 32 YALE L. J. 311, 324: "'Substance' includes all rules determin-
ing the legal relations which the courts will declare when all facts have
been made known to them ... " See CHAMBERLAYNE, EVIDENCE (1911)
§ 171.
3With reference to cases in which the award of an arbitrator has
been expressly made a condition precedent to the existence of any right
of action, Professor Corbin has recently said: "We should not deny that
an arbitrator is administering Legal Rights in cases falling within the
principle enunciated by the House of Lords in Scott v. Avery. That
was merely the case of a contract that created Conditional Legal Rights.
The award of an arbitrator in such a case would determine the legal
operation of the existing facts, even though a Cause of Action for damages
or an injunction does not yet exist, if the question of their legal opera-
tion was within the submission agreement or court order.... ." Conditional
Rights and the Functions of an Arbitrator (1928) 44 L. Q. REV. 24, 32.
4 The procedure in any given case in litigation in which remedial action
by a court may be obtained may even be regarded as substantive in this
respect that if the necessary procedural steps are taken a new substantive
right-duty or other legal relation or relations will be created when the
resulting judgment or decree is rendered. The procedural steps are opera-
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The questions which come up in a case involving an alleged
contract may be classified as follows: (1) interpretation of the
conduct of the parties (including their verbal or written expres-
sions)-a matter of ascertaining the operative facts; (2) the
legal consequences thereof; (3) procedure-a matter of the
machinery of the courts in litigation. A formalistic distinction
or definition should not, however, be allowed to override or
bury a consideration of policy, without regard to which the real
problem in a case cannot have been settled as thoroughly as pos-
sible. The ends sought in settling different types of problems
will require differing results, but these results should be franldy
explained on the basis of the differences in the purposes pre-
dominantly sought to be served in each case, not on the fictitious
basis of a mere abstraction5 There is grave danger of over-
looking this in conflict of laws cases, especially as regards the
tendency to treat domestic cases and conflict of laws cases as if
they were analytically and functionally alike. Not being even
analytically identical, diversity rather than similarity of treat-
ment from a functional standpoint is certainly to be expected.
Yet the failure to bear the distinctness of each in mind, or a tacit
assumption that they are or should be treated as in all respects
the same, is a source of much misunderstanding and confusion
of thought.6 Thus, "the termi 'procedure' may have one meaning
tive facts to which legal consequences are attached. Procedural law can
be translated into rights, duties, powers, liabilities, privileges, no-rights,
immunities, disabilities. The only workable line of distinction, it seems
to the writer, is between the legal consequences themselves, i. e., legal rela-
tions produced by the process of litigation, and the means, or machinery
whereby such legal consequences are brought about or such legal relations
established. Confusion and inconsistency of treatment can be minimized
only by excluding from treatment as merely procedural all that may pos-
sibly be regarded as substantive. Failure to adopt some such working
basis of differentiation, together with the lack of clear analysis, may
have and probably has occasioned to a large extent the confusion and
inconsistency of treatment to be noted in American cases dealing with
statutes of limitations of different types and, to some extent, in those
dealing with statutes of frauds. SALiOxD, op. cit. .,Lpra note 1, at 440:
uThe limitation of actions is the procedural equivalent of the prescription
of rights... ?" LORENZEN, ap. cit. supra note 2, at 2301: "Analytically the
statute of limitations and the statute of frauds present more or less the
same problem. Upon principle both affect the substantive rights, duties,
privileges, etc. of the parties." See also Comment (1919) 28 YALE L. J.
492.
5LORENZEN, op. cit. supra. note 2, at 332: "We must beware lest we
determine questions which should be controlled by considerations of policy
by a purely mechanical process."
6 See the following pioneer articles which show the fallacious analytical
bases commonly underlying the treatment of conflict of laws problem
by American writers and courts: Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of
the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 457; Lorenzen, Te2ritriality,
Pnllic Policy and the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YALE L. 3. 736.
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in natters of internal law, and a narrower meaning from the
point of view of the Conflict of, Laws." 7 Conceivably a rule or
stipulation which may ie treated as procedural for one purpose
may with fitness be treated as substantive for another purpose.
Furthermore, it is obvious that from a practical standpoint, the
extent to which an arbitration agreement is given effect may
actually render the legal consequences of an agreement as a
whole, entirely, partially or not at all what the parties mani-
festly stipulated for. The very object of the parties in providing
for arbitration may have been to make sure that certain things
be done, i. e., that certain consequences be attached, which might
be, and very likely would be, different because of the arbitration
than through litigation without arbitration. It was probably not
contemplated that the results secured by arbitration would be re-
garded as objectionable as a matter of policy by a court which
might have to deal with the controversy. Commercial arbitra-
tors may be expected to have courses of conduct in view in deal-
ing with matters familiar to them, and these may be totally
dissimilar from those which a court composed of men out of
touch with the particular kind of business concerned might have
in view. Hence different conclusions and differing results may
well be anticipated. The very differences to be anticipated in
the results or, more specifically, the very result to be expected
of arbitrators, as distinguished from the result to be expected
from a court, may very likely have been exactly what oc-
casioned the provision for arbitration. The results soughb by
the device of arbitration, it would seem, should ordinarily be
-given effect. It does not seem plausible to say that procedure
alone, and not legal consequences, are dealt with, or that the
legal consequences are the same whether or not arbitration pro-
visions are enforced.
We are then brought to this question: what is the scope of
the xule that "The lex fori ig applied to determine matters of pro-
cedure or remedy"? It is believed that this rule should be
confined to questions of procedure arising in relation to the ma-
chinery of litigation. By this, it is not meant that the rule of the
forum should never be applied as a substantive rule. The ob-
jection of the writer is to confusing substantive with procedural
questions. If in a given case a particular court has to decide
whether or not to hold an arbitration stipulation valid and bind-
ing upon the parties either before or after submission and arbi-
.tration, the question, being of the legal consequences of the
stipulation, should be treated as substantive from the standpoint
of the conflict of laws. In other words, the lex fori, under the
T.Lorenzen, op. cit. supra note" 2, at 330.
8 Watson,*I. J., in Hanilyn & Co. v. Talisker Distillery, [1894] A. C.
202, 213."
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conflict of laws rule which is being considered, is not appropriate
to determine the substantive effect of an arbitration stipulation
or an arbitration already carried out, but is appropriate, if at
all, only as a "curial rule" 8 as to the mode of applying the
machinery of the court for determining an issue which the court
has seen fit to deternine. To say that procedural law in
conflict of laws cases is regulated by the law of the forum
means that the law of the forum provides the machine through
which the legal consequences are produced, and that alterations
in the machine are not made when attending to a conflict of laws
case. A conflict of laws ease is put through the same mechanism
or handling as a case that is alike in all respects except that it
involves no conflict of laws question.
Dicey, in explaining the scope of the rule as applied by the
English courts, says:
"The maxim that procedure is governed by the lex fori means
in effect that it is governed by the ordinary rule of England,
without any references to any foreign law whatever. The mmm
is in fact a negative rule; it lays down that the High Court, in
common, it may be added, with every other English Court, pur-
sues its ordinary procedure and adheres to its ordinary methods
of investigation, whatever be the character of the parties or the
nature of the cause which is brought before it.... Whilst, how-
ever, it is certain that all matters which concern procedure are
in an English Court governed by the law of England, it is equally
clear that everything which goes to the substance of a party's
rights and does not concern procedure is governed by the law
appropriate to the ease.... Our Rule is clear and well estab-
lished. The difficulty of its application to a given case lies in
discriminating between matters which belong to procedure and
matters which affect the substantive rights of the parties. In
the determination of this question two considerations must be
borne in mind:-
"First: English lawyers give the widest possible extension to
the meaning of the term 'procedure'. The expression, as inter-
preted by our judges includes all legal remedies; and everything
connected with the enforcement of a right ....
Secondly, any rule of law which solely affects not the enforce-
ment of a right but the nature of the right itself, does not come
under the head of procedure." 0
While the use of the conflict of laws rule, that questions of
procedure should be determined according to the local rule of the
forum, to bring the question at hand under the local rule of the
forum is unmistakably apparent, this has been carried to such
an extent that considerations which should be regarded as of
greater import have sometimes been disregarded. Thus, ques-
tions which it would seem desirable to treat as substantive have
been swept under the rule that "the le.x fori determines proce-
dure." The tendency to apply this conflict of laws rule too widely
- DicEy, CONFLICT OF LAWS (Keith's 4th ed. 1927) 797.
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is no doubt given some further impulse by the failure of the
judges to see clearly that in the final analysis a court can apply
only its own law, whether or not the particular case has foreign
elements. Concerning this tendency, Professor Lorenzen has
made the following statements:
"From the standpoint of the Conflict of Laws there is the
greatest need of restricting the term 'procedure' to its proper
significance, for, according to the traditional rule in this subject,
all matters of procedure are submitted to the law of the forum.
English and American courts have been too prone to say in the
past that a particular matter belonged to procedure, and that
it was controlled therefore by the law of the forum. They have
given to the term a very wide meaning, with the consequence
that many matters, which on principle and according to the es-
tablished practice of other countries should be governed by some
other law, are subjected to the law of the place where the suit
happens to be brought. The reason for this attitude on the part
of the Anglo-American courts is not far to seek. The tendency
of the common law has always been to be exclusive. It is no
wonder, therefore, that when the English courts were first asked
to enforce rights 'created' by a foreign system of law, they should
welcome any doctrines which would operate restrictively in the
recognition and enforcement of such rights. They willingly ac-
cepted, therefore, the doctrine of the Dutch School which gave
to the term 'procedure' a very extensive meaning. By subjecting
to the law of the forum all matters belonging to procedure and
giving that term the widest possible meaning, the field for the
application of the 'foreign law' became necessarily reduced....
"The wide meaning given to the term 'procedure' in the Con-
flict of Laws has already done much mischief. Our courts would
do well to keep in mind the real meaning of the rule that all
matters of procedure are governed by the local law of the forum.
The sole object of the rule is to enable the courts to operate the
judicial machinery in the customary manner. There are vast
differences in the technical rules controlling the conduct of liti-
gation under the systems of procedure prevailing in the different
countries and any attempt to try a 'foreign' cause of action in
accordance with the rules of the state or country in which it
arose would be doomed to failure. A foreign litigant must there-
fore of necessity conform to the procedure of the court in which
he seeks to enforce his claim. There is no reason, however, why
a matter affecting the merits of the case or the operative effect
of facts when once proved should not be controlled by the law
governing the substantive rights of the parties, provided it is of
a nature to pass conveniently and without ethical shock through
the legal machinery of the forum. The label attaching to such
matter from the standpoint of internal law matters little. It may
be clearly 'substantive' or both 'substantive' and 'procedural' or
possibly even exclusively 'procedural' as these terms may have
been defined in the past." 1o
Even with the very wide meaning which the English Courts
have given to the term "procedure," for the purpose of applying
10 Lorenzen, op. cit. supra note 2, at 327-332.
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the rule that matters of procedure should be determined accord-
ing to the lex fori, they have not gone so far ag to deter-
mine the validity and enforceability of arbitration stipula-
tions by the lex fori, but have decisively rejected and repudiated
the contention that this should be done. As has been suggested,
however, this might not have been the case in the absence of the
existence in England of an internal rule favoring arbitration.
The English cases will now be briefly reviewed in order that
the mode of treatment by the English courts of the enforceability
of arbitration agreements in conflict of laws cases may be kept
in mind in considering the American decisions. In the most in-
fluential English case, that of Hanlyn & Co. v,. Taliskcr Distil-
lery,"' an agreement entered into in England between a Scottish
concern and a London company and performable in Scotland,
included a provision for the arbitration of any dispute by twvo
members of the London Corn Exchange, or their umpire. Action
was brought in Scotland for breach of contract and the arbitra-
tion clause was set up in defense. According to the English local
rule, the arbitration clause was enforceable as a part of the
agreement; according to the local rule of Scotland the clause
was invalid because the arbiters were not named. The Scottish
Court of Sessions applied the Scottish rule, holding that the ac-
tion was properly brought although arbitration had not been
had. This decision was reversed in the House of Lords, which
held that the English rule was applicable to the agreement as a
whole, including the arbitration provision and that the action
was therefore not maintainable in absence of submission of the
controversy to arbitration. As to the arbitration clause, Lord
Herschell said:
"That clause is as much a part of the contract as any other
clause of the contract." 12
In rejecting a contention that "the rule of the forum" ought to
be applied, he said:
"It is argued that an agreement to refer disputes to arbitra-
tion deals with the remedy and not with the rights of the parties,
and that consequently the forum being Scotch the parties can-
not by reason of the agreement into which they have entered in-
terfere with the ordinary course of proceedings in the Courts of
Scotland. Stated generally, I should not dispute that proposi-
tion so far as it lays down that the palties cannot, in a case
where the merits fall to be determined in the Scotch Courts,
insist, by virtue of an agreement, that those courts shall depart
from their ordinary course of procedure. But that is not really
.11 Supra note 8. "This is a particularly strong case as it was decided
by the House of Lords, when sitting as a Scottish Court of Appeal with
regard to an action brought in Scotland." DICEY, op. cit. ritpa note 9, at
612. i
12 Hamlyn & Co. v. Talisher Distillery, sapai note 8, at 207.
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the question which has to be determined in the present case. The
question which has to be determined is whether it is a case in
which the Courts of Scotland ought to entertain the merits and
adjudicate upon them." 1
It should be observed, also, that the decision of the Scottish
court below, that the local Scottish rule ought to be applied, was
based not on the ground that the proper rule was the rule of the
forum (lex fori) but on the ground that the rule of the place
of performance (lex solutionis), i. e., of Scotland, ought to be
applied.
In Spurier v. La Cloche,14 an action was brought in a Jersey
court by a Jersey resident, La Cloche, against the agents of an
English insurance company, under a fire insurance policy exe-
cuted in Jersey in the English language. By a provision of the
policy, "the claim should, if not admitted, be referred to arbi-
tration ... and... the claimant should have no right of action
against the company except for the amount of the claim, if ad-
mitted, or the amount, if any, awarded. . . ." La Cloche had
appointed one arbitrator to determine his claim, and the com-
pany another, but the appointed arbitrators had not designated
an umpire as the arbitration agreement required. Dismissal of
the action was sought on the ground that the requirement of
arbitration and the rendition of an award had not been carried
out. The claimant contended that the arbitration provision was
contrary to the law of Jersey (the lex foi) and therefore of no
effect. The Royal Court of Jersey, without comment, gave judg-
ment in favor of the claimant. The decision was reversed in
the House of Lords. The enforceability of the entire agreement
including the arbitration provision was treated as determinable
according to the rules of English law. The contention that the
usual Jersey rule, by which the arbitration provision would have
been held invalid, was appropriate of application, does not seem
to have been rested upon the ground that the rule of the forum
ought to be applied. Jersey, besides being the forum, was the
place of contracting, and may have been contemplated as the
place of performance as well, though the court applied the Eng-
lish domestic rule upholding the enforceability of the arbitration
stipulation.
In Pena Copper Mines, Ltd. v. Rio Tinto Co., Ltd.,5 the agree-
ment provided that it was to be construed as a contract made in
England, in accordance with the law of England, "and that the
rights, duties or liabilities of the parties should be referred to
arbitration in conformity with the provisions of the Arbitra-
tion Act, 1889, the award of the arbitrators to be a condition
13Ibid. 210.
14 [1902] A. C. 446.
- 105 L. T. R. 846 (1912).
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precedent to any liability of either party." The two companies
were English companies operating in Spain. The Rio Tinto Co.
had made a contract with a Belgian company which had as-
signed its rights, etc. to the Pena Copper Mlines with the as-
sent of the Rio Tinto Co. Both the original contract and the
assignment seem to have been executed in Spain. The Court of
Appeal sustained the issuance of an interim injunction to re-
strain the defendants, who had unsuccessfully brought an action
in. England, "from proceeding with an action in Spain on the
contract." '1 Speaking for the court, Fletcher Moulton, L. J.
said:
"In the present case by bringing an action in the Spanish
Court, the Rio Tinto Company are depriving the Pena Company,
the plaintiffs in the present action, of the right to apply to our
courts to prevent this dispute from being decided in any other
way than by arbitration. Therefore, we ought to exercise our
powers in personam to prevent that line of conduct taking effect
which is certainly contrarT to their contractual duties." ,-
Similar effect has been given in England to agreements to
refer disputes to a foreign court instead of to arbitration.'8 In
the Cap Blaiwco,"9 a bill of lading provided that any disputes as
to its interpretation were "to be decided in Hamburg according
to German law." The Court of Appeal held that the proceeding
in England must be stayed in order that the parties might liti-
gate in Germany.
One of the cases cited by counsel was Law v. Garrettj° in
which several British subjects, two of whom resided in England,
executed and registered in Russia an agreement pertaining to
the carrying on of a "partnership business" there, which pro-
vided that "all disputes,... shall be referred to the St. Peters-
burg Commercial Court (and) the decision of such court shall
be final." The defendants were held to be entitled, under section
11 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, to an order on
their motion for a stay of proceedings in the action commenced
in England, and a reference to the tribunal mentioned.
In Austrian Lloyd Steamship Co. v. Greslm Life Assurance
Soc., Ltd.,21 an appeal was allowed against an order refusing to
16 DicEY, op. cit. supra note 9, at 363.
17 Pena Copper Mines, Ltd. v. Rio Tinto Co., Ltd., supra note 15, at
852. The Lord Justice added that the question was one of "discretion."
'Is DiCEY, op. cit, supra, note 9, at 549n: "At one time effect would not
be given to arbitration clauses wherever made, as ousting the jurisdiction
of the courts of England. But since the Arbitration Act, 1SS9, which again
repeated provisions of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, this is no
longer the case. Moreover, agreement to refer to a foreign court will be
allowed as a valid ground for staying an action in England."
19 [1913] P. 130.
20 8 Ch. D. 26 (1878),
21 [1903] 1 K. B. 249.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
stay proceedings in an action on a policy of life insurance ef-
fected by a foreigner, a native of Trieste, with an English com-
pany at Budapest. The policy, which was written in the French
language provided that "For all disputes which may arise ...
all the parties interested expressly agree to submit to the juris-
diction of the Courts of Budapest." The provision was held to
constitute a "submission" under section 4 of the Arbitration Act
of 1889.
It is clear from the above decisions that, in determining
whether or not an arbitration agreement is to be enforced in
conflict of laws cases, the English courts have not applied the
normal rule of the forum, i. e., the rule corresponding with the
domestic rule of the forum, but have dealt with the conflict of
laws questions of the enforcement of arbitration provisions in
the same way that they have generally dealt with conflict of
laws questions of the enforceability of other contract provisions.
With this background the discussion of the American cases may
now be undertaken.
The decision and opinions in the New York Court of Appeals
case of Meacham v. Jamestown, Franklin & Clearfield R. R.2 1
are of interest as revealing apparent differences in the bases of
treatment by the judges, and as illustrating modes of treatment
often observable in conflict of laws cases, particularly the failure
to differentiate such cases from those which are entirely domes-
tic or intra-territorial. The controversy related to an arbitra-
tion provision in a railroad construction contract, by which a
certain chief engineer was made arbiter of all disputes that might
arise. The action was brought to recover from the defendant
railroad, a Pennsylvania corporation, a sum of money which the
plaintiff claimed as assignee for work done and materials fur-
nished by another Pennsylvania corporation. The agreement was
effected in Ohio. The submission which the arbitration provi-
sion called for had not been made.
The trial court held that the contract in question was to be
performed in the state of Pennsylvania, and since the law of
that state holding the contract valid and enforceable governed,
the plaintiff could not succeed in his action for the reason that
submission to arbitration was a valid condition precedent which
had not been complied with. This decision was unanimously
affirmed by the Appellate Division, but was reversed by the
Court of Appeals. There were two concurring opinions differing
totally in the explanatory basis for the result, and it is impossible
to say with which of the differing views expressed by Judge
Hogan and Judge Cardozo the majority of the concurring judges
agreed. The former treated the question of the validity and
enforcement of this arbitration clause as substantive, and op-
22 211 N. Y. 346, 105 N. E. 653 (,1914).
* ARBITRATION AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 627
posed enforcement on the ground that the clause was "an attempt
... to enter into an independent covenant or agreement to pro-
vide for an adjustment of all questions of difference arising be-
tween the parties by arbitration to the exclusion of jurisdiction
by the courts." Arbitration clauses in domestic cases had been
held invalid in New York. Judge Hogan said:
"Notwithstanding the decisions of the Court of Pennsylvania
that the contract as to arbitration was valid and enforceable in
that state, judicial comity does not require us to hold that such
provision of a contract which is contrary to a declared policy of
our courts shall be enforced as between non-residents of ourjurisdiction in cases where the contract is executed and to be
performed without this state, and denied enforcement when made
and performed within our state." .3
There is no logical necessity that the "policy" pointing toward
a particular result in a domestic case shall be carried over as
the ground of decision of a case involving extra-territorial ele-
ments. To say that such logical necessity exists is to assume
the identity of the two types of cases and to fail to apprehend, or
else to ignore, that conflict of laws cases, as distinguished from
domestic cases, may involve additional and distinct economic or
social considerations of importance. The significance of the dis-
tinctiveness of each of these two types of cases evidently was not
clearly seen in the Meacewun case, for it would seem from the
approval by Judge Hogan of the decision in Delaware & Hudson
Carnal Co. v. Pennsylvania. Coal Co.,"4 a case in -which only domes-
tic questions were regarded as at issue, that he would have wel-
comed some basis on which to distinguish the Mcacham case from
domestic decisions announcing the "declared policy" referred to
above. In the case referred to by Judge Hogan, an arbitration
agreement was upheld on "a distinction made between the pro-
visions of a contract, providing that before a right of action
shall accrue certain facts shall be determined, or amounts or
values ascertained, and an independent covenant or agreement
to provide for the adjustment and settlement of all disputes and
differences by arbitration to the exclusion of the courts." 23 That
distinction was studiously made, apparently for the purpose of
holding submission to arbitration and rendition of an award
necessary before action could be brought. Judge Hogan said
further that "in subsequent decisions the distinction thus pointed
out had been recognized and approved," 2r citing only cases which
were wholly domestic or were so treated. He seems to have
based his conclusion on the assumption that, of necessity, the
23 Ibid. 351, 105 N. E. at 655.
24 50 N. Y. 250 (1872).
SM eacham v. Jamestown, Franklin & Clearfield R. R., spra note 22,
at 350, 105 N. E. at 654.
26 Ibid. 351, 105 N. E. at 654.
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policy or rule put into effect in a domestic decision is to be
treated as a precedent in a conflict of laws case involving the
enforcement of an arbitration stipulation; or else to have failed
to discern any essential difference betveen the two types of
cases.
Judge Cardozo places his conclusion in the Meacham case upon
the premise that an arbitration agreement relates to the remedy
and is to be dealt with by the usual rule of the forum. But
from the emphasis which he gives to the argument that it is un-
desirable that the clause in question should be enforced, it seems
not to be doubted that the latter consideration, solely or pre-
dominantly, induced his conclusion and that his statement that
the rule of the forum was applicable, because the arbitration
provision is remedial, was merely an explanatory device or label.
It is quite convincing to one who reads Judge Cardozo's opinion
that his attitude toward the arbitration clause rests upon what
is commonly called "policy," that is, his notion of expediency un-
der the particular circumstances of the case at hand. Compar-
ing a provision that submission of controversies to a foreign
court shall be a condition precedent to recovery under a contract
with a provision making submission to arbitrators a condition
precedent, he said:
I "Indeed the considerations adverse to the validity of the con-
tract are more potent in the latter circumstances, for in the one
case we yield to regular and duly organized agencies of the state
and in the other to informal and in a sense irregular tribunals.
In each case, however, the fundamental purpose of the contract is
the same-to submit the, rights and wrongs of litigants to the
arbitrament of foreign judges to the exclusion of our own.
Whether such a contract is always invalid where the tribunal is
a foreign court we do not need to determine. There may con-
ceivably be exceptional circumstances where resort to the court
of another state is so obviously convenient and reasonable as tojustify our own courts in yielding to the agreement of the parties
and declining jurisdiction. If any exceptions to the general rule
are to be admitted, we ought not to extend them to a contract
where the exclusive jurisdiction has been bestowed, not on the
regular courts of another sovereignty, but on private arbitra-
tors. Whether the attempt to bring about this result takes the
form of a condition precedent or a covenant it is equally in-
effective." 2T
The strength of his feeling against enforcing the arbitration
clause in the case is all the more manifest when he says:
"Building contracts are made in New York to be performed all
over the United States. If the judgment of the court below is to
stand, jurisdiction over controversies arising under such con-
tracts may be withdrawn from our courts and the litigation re-
mitted to arbitrators in distant states." 28
271bid, 105 N. E. at 655.
28 Ibid., 105 N. E. at 656.
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It is to be noted, also, that there is the same failure by Judge
Cardozo clearly to distinguish domestic from conflict of laws
cases as was criticized above in considering Judge Hogan's
opinion. This appears from the following statement:
"It is true that some judges have expressed the belief that
parties ought to be free to contract about such matters as they
please. In this state the law has long been settled to the Coll-
trary." 29 (Italics ours).
Judge Cardozo's explanation of the arbitration clause as
remedial is as follows:
"An agreement that all differences arising under a contract
shall be submitted to arbitration relates to the law of remedies
and the law that governs remedies is the law of the forum. In
applying this rule, regard must be had, not so much to the form
of the agreement, as to its substance. If an agreement that a
foreign court shall have exclusive jurisdiction is to be con-
demned, it is not saved by a declaration that resort to a foreign
court shall be deemed a condition precedent to the accrual of a
cause of action. A rule would not long survive if it were subject
to be avoided by so facile a device. Such a contract, whatever
form it may assume, affects in its operation the remedy alone.
When resort is had to the foreign tribunal for the purpose of de-
termining whether certain things do or do not constitute a
breach, the cause of action must in the nature of things be com-
plete before jurisdiction is invoked and cannot be postponed by
the declaration that it shall not be deemed to have matured until
after judgment has been rendered." 30
The implication seems to be that "the cause of action" neces-
sarily is complete before the submission to the foreign court and
that as it is then complete nothing can be added to "the cause
of action" between that time and the time when the local court
passes on the effect to be attached to the submission, tacitly as-
suming that all that occurs intermediately cannot possibly be
substantive. From the standpoint of the foreign court, to which
submission is made, "the cause of action," i. e., the operative
facts to which the foreign court will or may attach certain legal
consequences so far as it has power to do so, may include only
events which have previously taken place; and yet "the cause of
action" may include the additional facts of submission of the
controversy to the foreign court and its decision or order. The
statement as an argument seems at best merely a verbal one,
but even if it could be said to have content or substance it is
based on the erroneous assumption of the identity of "the cause
of action" as respects the two tribunals involved. In spite of
Judge Cardozo's declaration that the arbitration provision was
purely "remedial" other portions of his opinion do reveal that
29 Ibid., 105 N. E. at 656.
30 Ibid-, 105 N. E. at 655.
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unprocedural considerations actually had weight in inducing his
conclusion in this particular case. This is apparent from his
above comparison of submission to a foreign court with submis-
sion to private arbitrators and with court litigation, which has
already been quoted, and especially from the following state-
ment:
"The presence of the parties here, the ownership of property
in this jurisdiction, these and other circumstances may make
resort to our courts essential to the attainment of justice. If
jurisdiction is to be ousted by contract, we may submit to the
failure of justice that may result from these and like causes." 31
Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc.2 included two cases, one
of which brought up the question whether the New York Arbitra-
tion Law 3 applied to contracts made but not litigated before
the statute went into effect, while the other raised the ques-
tion whether the Arbitration Law applied to cases as to which
litigation had already been commenced at the time of its passage.
The Arbitration Law was held to apply to the first but not to
the second of these cases. The statutory sections involved were
thus described by Judge Cardozo:
"Section 2 ... declares a new public policy and abrogates an
ancient rule: 'A provision in a written contract to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising... or a submission
hereafter entered into of an existing controversy to arbitration
. shall be valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, save upon such
grounds as exist.., for the revocation of any contract.... Sec-
tions 3 and 4 prescribe the procedure for the enforcement of the
contract and the naming of the arbitrator. Section 5 directs a
stay of proceedings 'if any suit or proceeding be brought' when
arbitration should be ordered." 34
Having set before himself the "new public policy" of New
York toward arbitration agreements, Judge Cardozo draws upon
a major premise under which a syllogism is readily constructed
with a conclusion which states the result desired-that the stat-
ute applies in the case where litigation had not been commenced
at the time that the statute was adopted. The major premise
selected is that the rule of the forum is to be applied in determin-
ing questions which are remedial and under this is placed, as a
minor premise, the proposition that whether an arbitration
agreement is to be enforced or not is a remedial question, by
"'Ibid., 105 N. E. at 656.
2230 N. Y. 261, 130 N. E. 288 (1921).
33 N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 1923) 28.
3 Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., supra note 32, at 269, 130 N. E.
at 289. These sections have been copied in New Jersey, Iassachusetts,
Hawaii, and in the federal arbitration act. N. J. Laws 1923, c. 134; Mass.
Acts 1925, c. 294; HAw. REv. LAWS (1925) c. 171; 43 STAT. 883 (1925),
9 U. S. C. (1926).'
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saying that "arbitration" is a form of procedure whereby differ-
ences may be settled," implying that it is nothing else:
"The common-law limitation upon the enforcement of prom-
ises to arbitrate is a part of the law of remedies.... The rule
to be applied is the rule of the forum.... Arbitration is a form
of procedure whereby differences may be settled. It is not a
definition of the rights and wrongs out of which differences
grow. This statute did not attach a new obligation to sales al-
ready made. It vindicated by a new method the obligations then
existing." 35
It has been pointed out that while arbitration is a method of
settling controversies, it also affects substantially the legal con-
sequences of the general bargain made by the parties to such
an extent that the right to have the arbitration stipulation car-
ried out may be and usually is regarded as vitally important.
By the making of the agreement providing for arbitration cer-
tain legal consequences are stipulated for, including the right and
duty to arbitrate. Judge Cardozo reveals the instrumental use
of the term "remedy" as a logical base, upon which the desired
result may be set, in making the following statements:
"The word 'remedy' itself conceals at times an ambiguity,
since changes of the form are often closely bound up with
changes of the substance.... The problem does not permit us
to ignore gradations of importance and other differences of
degree. In the end, it is in considerations of good sense andjustice that the solution must be found....
"Different considerations apply to the second of the cases...
To hold. that the Arbitration Law of 1902 applies in sutch condi-
tions is to nullify a cause of action by relation and by relation
a-gain to establish a defense. Years of costly litigation will thus
be rendered futile. Nothing in the language of the statute gives
support to the belief that consequences so harsh and drastic were
intended by the Legislature." ' (Italics ours).
Here it serves Judge Cardozo's purpose, as to the result desired,
not to treat the question of enforcement of the arbitration agree-
ment as procedural or remedial alone, but as involving the "net
substantive effect" 3- resulting from application or non-applica-
tion of the statute, i. e., in terms of legal "consequences harsh
and drastic" and of nullifying "a cause of action" in the sense
of destroying or changing existing legal relations. Likewise,
"establishing of a defense" is spoken of as changing the legal
relations between the parties.
The following statement shows that Judge Cardozo did not en-
tirely overlook the difference between applying the arbitration
statute in conflict of laws cases and applying it in domestic cases:
35 Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., supra note 32, at 210, 1,30 N. E.
at 289.
36 Ibid. 271-272, 130 N. E. at 290-291.
- Cook, Equitable Defenses (1923) 32 YAmZ L. J. 645, 653.
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"We do not now determine whether an arbitration clause,
framed in contemplation of the statute in Great Britain, and
calling for sessions of the arbitrators in London, is susceptible
of enforcement under the statute of New York." 88
In United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake
Petroleum Co., Ltd.,8 w tvo actions were brought by a South
Dakota corporation against a British corporation for alleged
breaches of similar charter parties concerning vessels of British
registry. Judge Hough noted in his opinion that the contract
was made in England, and contained a clause, valid ac-
cording to English law, providing for the settlement of dis-
putes in London by arbitration. He reviewed many cases, how-
ever, most of which had no foreign elements or were treated
as if only' domestic facts were involved, and reached a conclusion
apparently without having become aware that the instant case
might be distinguishable because of the conflict of laws ques-
tion involved. He had in mind the tacit assumption that, what-
ever might be the rule which should properly be applied in a
domestic case, a similar rule should be applied in a conflict of
laws case. If he can be regarded as having adopted any doctrine
or rule of the conflict of laws, it would seem to have been either
the rule that the lex fori determines questions of procedure, or
the so-called "public-policy" doctrine.4° Most of Judge Hough's
opinion consisted of the discussion or mention of some twenty
decisions to show "the causes advanced for refusing to compel
men to abide by their arbitration contracts," and dealt with this
attitude of the courts entirely. It contained no treatment of the
subject as a conflict of laws problem, and failed to distinguish
the cases which involved such a problem as, for example, Ham-
lyn & Co. v. Talisker Distillery,41 the Meacham case 4 and
Gough v. Hamburg A. P. A.,4 3 from cases in which no foreign
element was involved.
-
8 Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., supra note 32, at 273, 130 N. E.
at 291.
89 222 Fed. 1006 (S. D. N. Y. 1915).
40 "The doctrine of public policy in the Conflict of Laws ought to have
been a warning that there 'was something the matter with the reasoning
upon which the rules to which it is the exception were supposed to be based.
... If some power other than that of state A prescribes for A the rule
that is to govern "on principle", if that rule is obligatory upon state A,
how can state A deny effect to such rule in a particular case? . .. Is it
not strange to argue in the first place that state A has no choice in accept-
ing the original rule and then to admit that it has the power to set aside
the effect of that rule whenever it pleases on the plea that such recognition
or enforcement would violate its public policy?" Lorenzen, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 747.
41 Supra note 8.
42Supra note 22.
43158 Fed. 174 (S. D. N. Y. 1907), where the admiralty court refused
to stay proceedings in accordance with a clause requiring all disputes to
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Judge Hough said:
"The question is one of remedy and not of right. Such
was substantially the holding in Mitchell v. Dougherty and in
Stephenson v. Insurance Company it is pointed out that: 'The
law and not the contract prescribed the remedy; and parties
have no more right to enter into stipulations against a resort
to the courts for their remedy, in a given case, then they have
to provide a remedy prohibited by law."' "
The former 4, of the two cases just mentioned was a domestic
case and the latter" was so treated, although it had extra-
territorial elements. It is apparent, therefore, that the state-
ment by Judge Hough, that the question at hand "is one of
remedy and not of right," which he sought to support by the
two cases last mentioned, was not apposite to the conflict of
laws rule that remedial or procedural questions are to be deter-
mined by the lex fori. The next portion of the opinion, however,
presents a sudden shift to use of the term "remedy" with refer-
ence to that rule:
"Finally it has been well said by Cardozo, J., in Meacham v.
Jamestown etc., R. R. Co., that: 'An agreement that differences
arising under a contract shall be submitted to arbitration relates
to the law of remedies, and the law that governs remedies is
the law of the forum.' "'47
This reference to the le~x fori seems to have been added merely
to lend weight to a result reached upon a different ground. That
ground-if conceived of from the standpoint of conflict of laws
at all-seems to involve the so-called conflict of laws doctrine of
"public policy," with a tacit assumption that the attitude to be
assumed by a court toward an arbitration case in the conflict
of laws must necessarily be the attitude the court would take
in a similar case having no conflict of laws elements. Judge
Hough then concludes:
"It follows that the final question for determination is whether
the law as laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States
permits the enforcement as a remedy of the arbitration clause
contained in a contract; assuming that such clause (as here)
is intended to oust the courts and all courts of their jurisdic-
be settled by a specified foreign court; cf. The Howick Hall, 10 F. (2d)
162 (E. D. La. 1925), in which the court relied on Judge Hough's opinion
in United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co.,
Ltd., supra note 39.
Supra note 39, at 1011. Note that at the time of this decision neither
the New York Arbitration Law nor the United States Arbitration Act had
been passed.
4Mitchell v. Dougherty, 90 Fed. 639 (C. C. A. 3d, 1893).
"Stephenson v. Insurance Co, 54 Me. 55 (1866).
47United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lahe Petroleum Co,
Ltd., supra note 39, at 1011.
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tion I think the decisions cited show beyond question that the
Supreme Court has laid down the rule that such a complete
ouster of jurisdiction as is shown by the clause quoted from
the charter parties is void in a federal forum." 11
As none of the United States Supreme Court decisions cited
by Judge Hough considered the question of enforcement of
arbitration agreements otherwise than as a domestic question
it is clear that these decisions could not logically be said to show
what result the United States Supreme Court would reach in
a conflict of laws case.
It was said by Judge M1iack in a later case 4o that the result
in the Trinidad case "was reached . ..because of what was
assumed to be the public policy of the admiralty courts of the
United States, the lex fori," but it does not seem possible to
support any inference that the court sought to, ascertain such
"policy" with the rule in mind that the lex fori is to be applied
to determine questions of procedure.
In the Atlanten,"° the libelant, a Danish corporation char-
tered a steamer to the respondent, a corporation of Sweden, to
proceed to the United States and to return to Denmark with
a cargo. The charter party was executed in Denmark. While
the steamer was on the way to the United States, the respondent
repudiated the contract. The libelant sued to recover for the
resulting losses and the respondent set up as a defense the fail-
ure to submit to arbitration as agreed. A decree was entered
in favor of the libelant in the federal district court where Judge
Learned Hand said:
" ...under the law of Denmark and Sweden, arbitration is
the condition precedent to any suit. . . Therefore it becomes
necessary to determine whether the clause goes to the right or
to the remedy and whether it is a condition precedent under our
law if it goes only to the remedy.
"Such clauses, if regarded as conditions precedent to any
action, have, I believe, nearly always been held to touch the
remedy and not the right .... They do not affect to touch the
obligations of the parties, as surely they do not; they prescribe
4S Ibid.; cf. Judge Cardozo in Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., svpa
note 32, at 275, 130 N. E. at 292: "'In common language where no attempt
is made at logical accuracy', it is sometimes said that the contract of arbi-
tration 'ousts the jurisdiction' of the judges .... 'in strictness, however, It
does not oust the jurisdiction, but merely introduces a new plea into the
case' on which the judge as at common law, is under a duty to decide....
The situation is the same in substance as when effect is given to a release
or to a covenant not to sue. Jurisdiction is not renounced, but the time and
manner of its exercise are adapted to the convention of the parties restrict-
ing the media of proof."
49 Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 276 Fed. 319, 323 (S. D. N. Y.
1921).
50252 U. S. 313, 40 Sup. Ct. 332 (1919).
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how the palties must proceed to obtain any redress for their
wrongs, which covers only remedies." -
Judge Hand's argument that the arbitration clause goes "only
to the remedy," seems to have been directed to the purpose of
applying the rule that the lex fori is appropriate to decide purely
remedial questions. The decree was affirmed in the Circuit Court
,of Appeals := and on appeal to the United States Supreme Court
was again affirmed. Justice Holmes said:
".... we agree substantially with the views of Judge Learned
Hand in the District Court and Judge Hough in the Circuit Court
of Appeals. Their opinion was that the owner repudiated the
contract and that the arbitration clause did not apply.... such a
refusal was not a 'dispute' of the kind referred to in the arbitra-
tion clause." :
By adopting this view the Court avoided the question whether
the Court would or would not determine the legal effect of the
arbitration clause according to the domestic rule of the forum
and whether the result would be explained upon the basis that
the question determined was exclusively procedural.
The United States Supreme Court, in Red Cross Lbzc v,. At-
lantic Frzdt Co.,--, came to consider whether or not to treat the
specific enforcement of an arbitration agreement as exclusively
procedural, though not with reference to the rule that the lex fwi
should be applied to procedural questions. The agreement in-
volved was made before the New York Arbitration Law had been
passed. Proceedings in the federal district court were brought
after its passage but before decision of the New York Court of
Appeals in Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc.3 After that
decision, the respondent, who had set up the non-compliance of
libelant with the arbitration stipulation as a defense to the libel
brought for alleged breach of contract, applied for an order
in the Supreme Court of New York directing the libelant to
submit the controversy to arbitration pursuant to the statute.
Such an order was granted. This was affirmed by the Appellate
Division and then reversed by the Court of Appeals.- This
last decision was then reversed by the United States Supreme
Court.
The agreement had been executed in New York and pertained
to the transportation of a cargo from New York to a port of
Z1 Aidieselskabet Korn-Og Foderstof Kompagniet v. Rederiatiebolaget
Atlanten, 232 Fed. 403, 405 (S. D. N. Y. 1916).
52250 Fed. 935 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917).
53The Atlanten, supra note 50, at 315, 40 Sup. Ct. at 333.
!; 264 U. S. 109, 44 Sup. Ct. 274 (1924).
z5 Supra note 32.
6 Matter of Red Cross Line, 233 N. Y. 373, 135 N. E. 821 (1922), rcu'g
199 App. Div. 961, 191 N. Y. Supp. 949 (1st Dep't 1921).
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Newfoundland. It contained a provision for the settlement of
any dispute that might arise between owners and charterers
by arbitration in New York. The disposition of the application
for specific enforcement of the arbitration clause involved
Article III, Section 2 of the federal Constitution which provides,
inter alia, that "the judicial power shall extend .., to all cases
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction . . ." and section 256,
clause 3 of the Judicial Code 57 providing that the federal courts
shall have exclusive jurisdiction, as to all civil admiralty and
maritime cases. In reversing the decision of the Appellate Di-
vision, Judge Hogan speaking for the court said:
"Even if we assume that the proceeding is practically one
to enforce specific performance of the arbitration clause of the
contract an order granting such relief presupposes the existence
of a controversy the subject-matter of which is within the juris-
diction of the court granting the order. . . . The agreement
to arbitrate ... is part of a maritime contract .... Such clause
is void in the federal forum .... To sustain the arbitration
clause and enforce the same in the state courts would deny to the
federal court the exclusive jurisdiction with which Congress has
clothed it and likewise destroy a rule of uniformity." 8
It has been noted that in the Meacham case 9 Judge Hogan
did not treat the question of enforcement of an arbitration
clause as procedural, although Judge Cardozo did so treat it.
Judge Hogan's statement, above quoted, could only be consistent,
it would seem, with treatment of the question of specific enforce-
ment as a substantive question. How otherwise could any order
for specific enforcement relate to the "subject-matter" of con-
troversy to be dealt with?
The term "subject-matter within the jurisdiction of the
court" is meaningless unless, in the final analysis, legal conse-
quences are referred to. Statements like those of Judge Cardozo
in the Berkovitz case, extracting all content from the expected
result of arbitration, are to be contrasted with statements like
those of Judge Hogan just quoted; to observe how the judicial
bottle labelled "arbitration" is now filled, now emptied, accord-
ing to whether a full bottle or an empty bottle will make the
decision appear more plausible. Judge Cardozo empties the
bottle or else makes it appear empty by saying:
"The rule to be applied is the rule of the forum .... Arbitra-
tion is a form of procedure whereby differences may be settled.
It is not a definition of the rights and wrongs out of which
differences grow." 60
5740 STAT. 395 (1917), 28 U. S. C. § 371 (1926).
58 Supra note 56, at 381, 135 N. E. at 824.
59 Supra note 22.
60 Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., supra note 32, at 270, 130 N. E.
at 289.
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The statement that "arbitration is a form of procedure" is
made with the negative inference that it is nothing else. This
negation is then put in the next statement: "It is not a
definition of the rights and wrongs out of which differences
grow." And this statement is then left to stand as a denial of
the function of the process, so as to present an assertion that
since arbitration is procedure it does not define rights, etc. It
could as easily and as plausibly be said that, "Litigation is a
form of procedure whereby differences may be settled. It is
not a definition of the rights and wrongs out of which differences
grow"-thereby reaching the conclusion that right-duty or other
legal relations are not defined or declared by the process of liti-
gation. Thus, we should bring ourselves to deny that legal
consequences are produced at all, by denying that the terms,
which we use to describe legal consequences, describe anything.
In Red Cross Line v. AtIo.antic Fridt Cowpany,c' the United
States Supreme Court, in reversing the New York Court of
Appeals, found it convenient to treat the New York Arbitra-
tion Law, and so arbitration itself, as remedial purely and not
substantive. Justice Brandeis, spealdng for the court, said the
statute dealt "merely with the remedy in the state courts (with-
out attempting) either to modify the substantive maritime law
or to deal with the remedy in courts of admiralty."
Justice McReynolds dissenting remarked:
"No admiralty court would enforce the arbitration clause of
the charter party before us; their accepted policy forbids. Ac-
cordingly it was not obligator., upon the parties. The law of
the sea becomes part of their agreement. But it is said under
the local law, a state court may enforce arbitration and thus
effectuate the provision, although unenforceable in admiralty,
since the statute related to the remedy and not to substantive
rights. . . . Under the guise of providing remedies no state
statute may add to or take from the obligations imposed by
the contract within the admiralty jurisdiction." r-
In the litigation of Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line in the
federal courtc 3 libelant's failure to submit to arbitration was
not recognized as a defense. Judge Mack, quoted Judge Cardozo
in the Berkovitz case,, 4 and placed the decision upon the ground
that: "Arbitration statutes or judicial recognition of the en-
forceability of arbitration provisions do not confer a substan-
tive right, but a remedy only." 5
Judge Hough in the Circuit Court of Appeals, in affirming the
decision of the district court said that although the New York
61 Supra note 54, at 124, 44 Sup. Ct. at 277.
-2 Ibid. 126, 44 Sup. Ct. at 278.
63Supra note 49.
6 Supra note 32.
Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, siepra note 49, at 323.
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Arbitration Act afforded a remedy in this instance the statute
had no effect upon "whatever remedy the admiralty offered." 1
The opinion of Judge Mack in the lower court indicates that
the decision of that court was reached after a good deal of
reluctance,, for he said:
"I recognize the growing sentiment in the commercial world,
... that the law ought not to interfere and render arbitration
agreements ineffective. . . . Arbitration clauses are found in
virtually all the standard forms of charter parties and are par-
ticularly favored by shipping men as a means of avoiding litiga-
tion in distant countries before foreign tribunals. It is, moreover,
important that in these matters American maritime law should
accord with that of the other great maritime countries. Nor
should it be overlooked that an unfortunate situation is created
if arbitration agreements can be repudiated in American courts
while American citizens can insist upon their enforcement in
their favor as a bar to litigation abroad.... Nevertheless, sitting
in this circuit, I am constrained to follow the decisions in the
Atlanten and the Eros..." 7
Judge Hough in his opinion in the Circuit Court of Appeals
commented as follows upon the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co."
"It is strenuously urged that the arguments presented at this
bar when The Atlanten was before us ... and in the Eros have
now received such additional strength by the decision of the
Supreme Court in Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Company
that it is our duty to . . . hold that the second defense was
good.... We are asked to assume that the Supreme Court, with-
out the compulsion of any statute, is now ready to hold that
in proceeding upon an executory contract containing an agree-
ment to arbitrate any and all disputatious matters arising there-
from, no action would lie upon an arbitrable dispute, if the
party sded pleads (as here) the arbitration clause and willing-
ness to abide thereby.... The point has been conveniently pre-
sented before now to the Supreme Court. The appeal in The
Atlanten . . . afforded an opportunity which was confessedly
avoided. The refusal to enforce executory agreements to arbi-
trate disputes still continues and it is not only permitted, but
generally believed to be required by the decisions of the Supreme
Court, if adherence to the spirit as well as the letter of con-
trolling opinion by loyal obedience to the precedent system. This
particular charter party called for arbitration in New York....
The majority of such charters are drawn with provisions for
arbitration in London and with an eye to the existing arbitration
statutes of Great Britain. Very wisely, the New York Court
of Appeals called attention to this difficulty in Berkovitz v. Arbib
& Houlberg and especially reserved the question (not yet pre-
sented) whether the New York statute can or should be so read
as to cover arbitrations in foreign parts." co
O6 Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 5 F. (2d) 218 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924).
6 Supra note 49, at 322.
6BSupra note 54.
19Supra note 66, at 220.
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In the case of the Eros,7* a libel was brought for alleged breach
of a time charter entered into at Paris, relating to a yacht of
French registry flying, the French flag. The libelant vas an
American citizen residing in Paris. The owner was a French
citizen residing in Paris and his interests were asserted in the
name of the master, as claimant. The yacht was chartered to
libelant to be delivered with master and crew for libelant's use
at New York, where she arrived July 27th, 1914. While minor
repairs were being made, war was declared between France and
Germany and the master, under orders from the owner, refused
to proceed on the ground that some of his crew were subject to
call for French war service. Such members were afterwards
discharged and after some days of negotiations, the master under
instructions of the owner, refused to fill the crew or move from
the port, even within waters of the United States, and declared
that "the whole thing is all off," whereupon libelant procured
another yacht. The yacht was not requisitioned by the French
government. The charter contained a provision that any dis-
pute should be submitted to arbitration and that, "This agree-
ment to be construed according to English law." Claimant con-
tended that the action should be dismissed until arbitration as
provided for had been had or had failed. In rendering a decree
for libelant, Judge Veeder said:
"If such a general arbitration clause would ever apply to a
repudiation of the agreement ... it is clear that it goes to the
remedy, not to the rights, of the parties, and that its effect is
to be determined by the law of the forum. And in this forum
it is well settled that such a general arbitration clause is in-
effective to deprive the parties of their right to appeal to the
courts .... " 71
It seems quite obvious that the provision for construing the
agreement according to the law of England was an attempt to
select one set of legal consequences as against another. To the
extent that its decision imposes another, differing set of legal
consequences the court would surely seem to be determining a
substantive question independent of the meaning to be given to
the words of the agreement.
The provision quoted would seem unnecessary and superfluous
if it does not declare a selection of "English" as against other
possible legal consequences. The court brushes aside this phase
of the case, however, to treat the question of enforcement of
the arbitration agreement as procedural in order to avoid giving
the agreement effect, preserving alignment with the previous
federal decisions cited in support of the conclusion. On appeal
to the federal Circuit Court of Appeals, the decree for the libelant
7o 241 Fed. 186 (E. D. N. Y. 1916).
71 Ibid. 191.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
was affirmed by Circuit Judges Ward and Hough and District
Judge Learned Hand, in a per curiam opinion which declared
that, "the provision as to arbitration is not enforceable in our
courts." 72
Two recent decisions have treated the question of the enforce-
ment of an arbitration award as substantive, applying the rule
of the "place of making" of the agreement (lex loci contractus).
Taylor v. Basye 73 dealt with the question of enforcement of an
arbitration award rendered outside of the state of Washington
but which, if it had been rendered within that state, would not
have been enforced for lack of fulfilment of the Washington
statutory requirement that an award be recorded and entry of
judgment made thereon.7 4 The arbitration provision was part
of an agreement entered into in Oregon, the subject matter
of which embraced a lease of land situated in Washington
and certain other personal property. The court said:
ou . . an agreement for arbitration made in this state is with-
out effect unless it complies with our statute.... It is admitted
that this award is good, as a common law award and legal under
the laws of the state of Oregon, where it was made, and it seems
to be sufficient in all respects to comply with the law of this
state except that it was never made a matter of record, norjudgment entered upon it as our laws prescribe. The parties
entering into the agreement were both in the state of Oregon.
The subject matter embraces a lease which under our laws is
a chattel interest ... and certain other personal property con-
cerning which the parties were free to contract irrespective of
where it was situated.
"... a contract good in the state where it is made can be
enforced in another state even though it is not executed with
the formalities required in the latter state ..." 7
The court, referring to two early cases, called attention to
the fact that the rule just stated had been applied to arbitration
agreements. Green v. East Tennessee & Georgia R. R.10 had up-
held an award on the ground that, "The contract containing the
agreement to refer was a Tennessee contract and as such its
validity and construction in the Courts of Georgia depended upon
the laws of Tennessee." There is nothing to indicate that the
possibility of regarding the question as procedural, to be dis-
posed of according to the rule of the forum, was thought of.
Titus v. Scantling 77 had upheld an award made pursuant to a
certain bond whereby defendant undertook to pay the amount
which should be awarded by certain arbitrators. The bond was
72 251 Fed. 45 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918).
7 119 Wash. 263, 205 Pac. 16 (1922).
- WAsH. Coiwr. STAT. (Remington, 1922) §§ 420 et seq.
7- Taylor v. Basye, supra note 73, at 265, 205 Pac. at 16.
7637 Ga. 456 (1867).
774 Blackf. 89 (Ind. 1835).
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executed in Ohio and "was to be there complied with" both as
to the making of the award and as to payment of the amount
awarded. Whether the award was actually made in Ohio or
Indiana does not appear. The court held the award valid under
the Ohio rule, saying that the result should be the same were
the Indiana rule to be applied. The court did not make any
differentiation between the treatment of arbitration provisions
and the treatment of contract provisions in general in con-
flict of laws cases.
In Fisher Floitring Mills Co. v,. United States,73 arbitration
was agreed upon after a dispute had arisen. The federal dis-
trict court held the award valid, although it had not been "filed
in the office of the clerk of the Superior Court of the county
wherein the arbit-ration" was held or entered on the records
of the court and affirmed by the court as a judgment, as the
Washington arbitration statute required in order to make it
"conclusive." In reversing the judgment rendered in favor of
the United States, Rudkin, J., said:
"The agreement to submit to arbitration was made in (Wash-
ington), the arbitration took place there, the award was made
there, and the validity and effect of the award must be deter-
mined by reference to its laws." 70
The decision in the case of The Silverbrookp4 holding the
United States Arbitration Act of 1925 6' inapplicable to an
arbitration agreement which provided that the arbitration should
take place in England was, in the writer's opinion, very unfor-
tunate. A charter party between an English corporation and the
claimant, an American corporation, stipulated for a voyage from
London to New Orleans, and provided that any disputes were
to be settled by arbitration in London. The libelant, the holder
of bills of lading (into which the charter party was incorporated
by reference), filed a libel in rem for damages to the cargo.
The claimant sought to stay the proceedings on the ground that
the contract sued on constituted a maritime transaction or con-
tract involving commerce within the terms of the United States
Arbitration Act. The motion for a stay of the suit was denied,
Judge Burns saying:
"It is plain enough that Congress intended to abolish the old
rule,. . . by which the federal courts refused to enforce arbitra-
tion agreements. But . . . the act seems to contemplate only
such arbitration agreements as would be or could be carried
out in the United States, within the jurisdiction of and under
the control and orders of the United States Courts....
78 17 F. (2d) 232 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927).
-Ibid. 235.
80 18 F. (2d) 144 (E. D. La. 1927).
31 Supra note 34.
32 The Silverbrook, supra note 80, at 145.
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"My conclusion seems fortified by the terms of each of these
sections, which clearly contemplate what in effect amounts to
a judicial enforcement of specific performance of arbitration
clauses ... the courts of the United States, necessarily, however,
confining these courts within the legitimate bounds of their terri-
torial jurisdiction. . . This court is without jurisdiction to
direct the parties to proceed to arbitration as required by the
concluding clause of (Section 8) because the place and manner
of arbitration prescribed by the terms of the contract are beyond
the jurisdiction of this court since the hearings and proceedings
thereunder cannot be'held conformably to the terms of this stat-
ute, and particularly to Section 4, which requires the arbitration
to proceed within the district in which the petition for an order
directing such arbitration was filed. This court cannot direct
and otherwise supervise and conclude an arbitration to be held
in London, or assume to vacate, modify, or correct any award
that might be made there, or indeed anywhere, except within
this district, nor has it power as a court of admiralty to arbi-
trarily reform or modify the terms of the contract by ordering
an arbitrhtion elsewhere or otherwise than agreed upon by the
parties."
Having concluded that the statute was inapplicable to this
particular case, the court refused specific enforcement of the
arbitration stipulation upon the assumption that the statute not
being applicable, no other result could justifiably be brought
about in view of the previous federal decisions. It is submitted,
however, that this assumption was mistaken and that upon more
thorough analysis of the case as a problem in the conflict of
laws a decision specifically enforcing the arbitration agreement
could have and should have been made.
It is evident that the result arrived at issued from the funda-
mental postulate in the mind of the judge as to the nature of
any problem in the conflict of laws, that any such problem re-
solves itself into ascertaining what state or country has "juris-
diction" in the sense of exclusive power to determine for all
states or countries the rule of law to be applied to the given
factual situation. This is on the basis "that for every situa-
tion dealt with in the conflict of laws there is always some one
and only one 'law' which has 'jurisdiction', i.e. power, to deter-
mine what legal consequences shall be attached to the given
situation," 83 with the assumption which usually inheres in such
3 "Rights being created by law alone, it is necessary in every case to
determine the law by which a right is created. . . " BEALE, SUMMIARY OF
THE CONFLIC'M OF LAWS (1902) § 41.
"Some proper law must have governed the juridical situation at thb
moment of its occurrence; the effort of the court is to determine what that
law was; and that is the question of the power of some particular law to
extend to and rule the juridical situation." BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1916) 1.
"The branch of the law called for convenience THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
deals primarily with the application of laws in space. Whenever a question
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a view (unless the other horn of this dilemma, acceptance of
the ,revoi doctrine, is chosen)-the assumption that the rule
to be adopted in a conflict of laws case is identical with the
domestic rule of the state or country regarded as having "juris-
diction" in the sense explained. The latter assumption is appar-
is raised of applying to a juridical situation the law of one or another
country, the question so raised must be settled by the principles of the
Conflict of Laws." Ibid.
"A right having been created by the appropriate law, the recognition of
its existence should follow everywhere. Thus an act where done cannot be
called in question anywhere .... This is true even if the right so created
is absolutely illegal in the other State." BEALS, SUIM=.iY OF THE CON-
FLICT OF LAWS (1902) § 47.
"For the creation of rights there must exist some law with power to
create them, or in the ordinary phrase, with jurisdiction." Ibid. § 6.
"It is impossible that a single event should be followed by tvo contra-
dictory consequences. Only one law, therefore, can have jurisdiction." Ibad
§ 11.
"The topic called 'Conflict of Laws' deals with the recognition and en-
forcement of foreign created rights." Ibid. § 1.
Note how all juristic meaning in the sense of connotation of legal con-
sequences is taken from the terms "creation" and "recognition." as applied
to rights, in the following statements by which the existence and extent
of "rights" as legal consequences are treated as depending finally, if not
entirely, upon "enforcement," although it seems, according to Beale, that
a "right?' must be first "created" by "the proper law" before there can
be "enforcement" of it, viz.: "Though a foreign right must be recognized
as existing, it does not follow that it will be given any legal force. Since
a right can have no legal force unless it is given force by law, and since
nothing can have the force of law in a State except the law of that State,
it follows that no foreign right can be enforced unless the law of the State
so provides. This depends on the law as to the enforcement of foreign
rights." Ibid. § 48. "But since the enforcement comes through the domestic
law, that law may refuse to give any effect to the right." Ibid. § 49. In
view of the latter statements, is it a workable explanation to say, as Pro-
fessor Beale does, that, "The primary purpose of law being the creation
of rights ... the chief task of the Conflict of Laws (is) to determine the
place where a right arose and the law that created it."? BEALE, CO.NFLIcM
OF LAWS '(1916) § 139. Is it convenient or necessary to use the term
"right" with such shifting connotation as sometimes to give it a meaning
signifying legal consequences and at other times to withdraw that meaning,
transferring the connotation of legal consequences entirely into the term
"enforcement"? To speak of a "right" as being "created" with respect to
a particular court and then to say that that court must "recognize" it al-
though the court need not or will not "enforce" the so-called "right," does
not seem to be useful in the description or prediction of what a court will
do in a given case and only calls in an unreal phantom which is an intruder
so far as the thought processes are concerned. Using the term "right" to
describe what courts or other societal agents will actually do, is it not
a clearer and more accurate description of what happens to acknowledge
that in conflict of laws cases, apart from constitutional limitations, "each
state has the power to attach different legal consequences to a particular
group of operative facts" although "it would be highly inconvenient as well
as unjust if the power were exercised in every instance" [Lorenzen, Te
Theory of Qualificatio'ns and the Conflirt of Law3 (1920) 20 CoL. L. Rsv.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
ent in the statement of Judge Burns that before the federal
Arbitration Act was passed "arbitration agreements of this
character were void," making no distinction between domestic
and conflict of laws cases, as it is also apparent in his explana-
247, 279] and to explain what is done thus: "The forum, when confronted
by a case involving foreign elements, always applies its own law to the case
but in doing so adopts and enforces as its own law a rule of decision iden-
tical, or at least highly similar though not identical in scope with a rule
of decision found in the system of law in force in another state or country
with which some or all of the foreign elements are connected, the rule so
selected being in normal cases and subject to (exceptions) the rule of de-
cision which the given foreign state or country would apply, not to this
very group of facts now before the court of the forum, but to a similar but
purely domestic group of fact! involving for the foreign court no foreign
element. . . . The forum thus enforces not a foreign right but a right
created by its own law." Cook, op. cit. supra note 6, at 469-470. As Pro-
fessor Corbin puts it very concisely: "Each jurisdiction, in so far as it is
politically independent, can and does choose the rule that it sees fit and
thus the court of the forum makes for itself, its own law in each case."
ANSON, CONrRACMrS (Corbin's 4th ed. 1924) 110. Compare the following
statements by Judge Learned Hand: "No court can enforce any law but
that of its own sovereign." Guinness v. Miller, 291 Fed. 769, 770 (D. C.
1923). "I can only follow the law of the place where I sit.... No court
can enforce the law of another place." Direction der Disconto-Gesellsehaft
v. U. S. Steel Corp., 300 Fed. 741, 744 (D. C. 1924).
It is only because a conflict of laws case is seen to be different from a
domestic case so that no domestic rule is applicable in itself, that any prob-
lem in conflict of laws is or can be recognized. Yet the theory that the
"Conflict of Laws deals with the recognition and enforcement of foreign-
created rights" or "with the application of laws in space" is inconsistent
with the very hypothesis upon which the recognition of the presence of a
problem of conflict of laws, as distinct from a domestic problem, depends.
The method which this theory leads to is misleading not only in the treat-
ment of so-called substantive questions but also in the treatment of ques-
tions taken to be procedural and placed under the rule that "the lex fori
determines questions of procedure." In this regard the danger is that the
proper application of the rule, as merely signifying that changes of machin-
ery of the court of the forum will not be made in a conflict of laws case,
will be lost sight of and that questions which should be treated as substan-
tive, either wholly or partly, will be treated as merely procedural and me-
chanically relegated to some domestic rule of the forum-treating the
factual situation as having created merely a logical problem and excluding
all economic and social considerations. This, it is believed, has been the
effect or tendency of this method in the treatment of arbitration cases,
discussed above, in several instances, if not in every instance in which the
question of whether or not an agreement to arbitrate disputes should be
enforced was treated as "governed by the law of the forum" upon the
ground that it related to "procedure" or "remedy." For example, in the
following statement Judge Hough clearly seems to take the view that the
subject of conflict of laws deals with the operation of law in space, in the
sense that the problem in each case is that of identifying "the proper law"
having territorial "jurisdiction," i. e., exclusive power to determine the legal
consequences of a factual situation: "What New York and other courts
regarded as the 'common law limitation upon enforcement of promises to
arbitrate' was a part of the law of remedies, which is a portion of the law
644
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tions of the decisions in the cases of The Eros 4 and Uitdtcd
States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petrolczin Co.5
Thus Judge Burns, in explaining the decision in the case of
The Eros, apparently regarded it as imperative that whatever
rule the court of the forum would apply in the normal domestic
case must be applied in a conflict of laws case. The same idea
stands out strongly in the interpretation by Judge Burns of
Judge Hough's opinion in United States Asphalt Rcfiwning Co.
v. Trinidad Lake Petroleun Co., and the application of his inter-
pretation to that case, which involved a quite similar arbitra-
tion agreement.
His explanation first states the conflict of laws rule:
"The decision was to the effect that an agreement in a con-
tract that differences arising thereunder shall be submitted to
arbitration relates to the remedy and the question whether such
an agreement was enforceable was governed by the rule of the
forum." S
He then announces as the rule of the forum to be employed
in the foregoing conflict of laws formula the ordinary domestic
rule of the forum (that is a rule conceived apart from any con-
flict of laws problem), saying that the decision was also
".... to the effect that a provision in a charter party made in
London that 'any dispute arising under this charter shall be
settled in London by arbitration.., and this decision shall be
binding upon both parties' was an agreement for arbitration
applied to the whole contract and while valid under the English
Arbitration Act of 1889, it was void in a federal forum." 87
That Judge Burns, like Judge Hough, merely had in mind the
domestic rule without regard to the conflict of laws elements
or phases is clear from his remark that,
"Judge Hough carefully reviewed the existing jurisprudence
and concluded that the doctrine was settled by the Supreme
Court; that is, that where such clauses in contracts operate a
complete ouster of the jurisdiction of the courts they should be
held void in a federal court." S8
It will be recalled that Judge Hough in Uizited States Asphalt
Refiing Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petrolcum Co.,60 after remarking
near the end of his opinion, "Furthermore the question is one
of the forum," inferring that there are other "parts" of the law which are
"portions" of some other "law" than that of the forum. Atlantic Fruit Co.
v. Red Cross Line, supra note 66, at 219.
84 Supra note 70.
M Supra note 39.
86 The Silverbrook, svpra note 80, at 145.
87 Ibid.
80 Supra note 39.
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of remedy and not of right,"m quoted Judge Cardozo to the
effect that an arbitration agreement "relates to the law of reme-
dies and the law that governs remedies is the law of the forum,"
and then said:
"It follows that the final question for determination . . .is
whether the law as laid down by the Supreme Court of the
United States permits the enforcement as a remedy of the arbi-
tration clause contained in a contract.... I think the decisions
cited show beyond question that the Supreme Court has laid
down the rule that such a complete ouster of jurisdiction as is
shown by the clause quoted from the charter parties is void
in a federal forum." 9'
The "decisions cited" to which he refers were nearly all
domestic cases or were so treated, as has been pointed out above,
and the one or two conflict of laws decisions which were cited
were mentioned indiscriminately along with the domestic deci-
sions and entirely without regard to their conflict of laws aspects.
Hence they could not be said to be precedents in conflict of laws
cases. It will be recalled also that it was Judge Hough him-
self, who in an opinion written nine years later expressly called
attention to the fact that the United States Supreme Court had
never undertaken to decide the question of specific enforcement
of an arbitration agreement as a matter of the conflict of laws.2-
'So far as the decision in United States Asphalt Refining Co. v.
Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co. 9 3 is concerned, whether the deci-
sion as a conflict of laws decision is ascribed to the rule that
procedural questions should be determined according to the lex
fori or to the so-called "public policy" doctrine, it is clear that
the decision was reached by treating the conflict of laws rule
as necessarily identical with the domestic rule which had be-
come established in federal cases.
It is believed, therefore, that the decision in the case of The
Silverbrook 9 4 rested upon an assumption that, apart from the
United States Arbitration Act, the conflict of laws rule as to
the enforcement of arbitration agreements depended upon and
was necessarily identical with the domestic rule in the federal
courts. It is submitted that, conceding that the Arbitration Act
did not cover this particular situation, it did, at least, do away
with the former domestic rule in admiralty for the federal courts,
establishing a new domestic rule, if not also a conflict of laws
rule as to such arbitration agreements as could be carried out in
the United States. Consequently, even upon the assumption by
90 Ibid. 1011.
91 Ibid.
- Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, mtpra note 66, at 220.
93 Supra note 39.
94 Supra note 80.
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the court that the conflict of laws rule should be identical with
or similar to the domestic rule or upon the adoption by the court
of the same method of arriving at a decision as it supposed
itself to be employing, should not the court have enforced the
arbitration agreement in accordance with the policy of the stat-
ute, although the statute by its own force may not have been
strictly applicable?
In the instance afforded by this particular case a desirable
result from a commercial standpoint might conceivably have
been attained by the purely mechanical method outlined above.
But proceeding from the postulate that a problem in conflict
of laws is merely a problem of spacial "jurisdiction," the prob-
abilities are that an unsatisfactory commercial result would be
reached by the decision, because the pursuit of such a method
ignores economic and social factors arising from the interstate
or international phases of the situation.
The decision in The Silverbrook,0 rendered in March, 1927
was overruled, however, in October of the same year in Daniel-
sen v. Entre Rios,1 insofar as the court in the earlier case had
"refused a stay of trial, holding that the act had no application
to contracts for arbitration performable outside the United
States." -- A clause providing for "arbitration in London in
the customary manner" was included in a charter party entered
into in London between the agents of South American charterers
and the master of a Norwegian vessel for the carriage of coal
from Baltimore, or a nearby port, to South America. The libel
was brought to recover for delay caused by failure of the char-
terers to notify the master before his arrival at what port he
should load. It was held in accord with the decision in the case
of The Fredensbro,8 involving an arbitration clause of precisely
the same kind and a similar set of facts, that the arbitration
clause "did not form a basis for excepting to the jurisdiction of
the court," but that the act "requires the courts to stay trial, upon
motion of one of the parties, until arbitration is had, and to order
arbitration if, as provided in section 4, the hearing and proceed-
ings under such agreement shall be within the district in which
e' Ibid.
96 22 F. (2d) 326 (D. 31d. 1927).
W' In Lappe v. Wilcox, 14 F. (2d) 861 (N. D. N. Y. 192G), it was held
that the New York Arbitration Law was not applicable to non-residents
of New York and motion to stay the action under the statute was denied.
Plaintiff and defendant, residents of Pennsylvania and New York, respcec-
tively, had made an agreement in New York which provided for arbitra-
tion. The court based its decision on the ground that the New York statute
was remedial and could not affect a non-resident so as to preclude him
from suit in a federal court. Note that the court treats the question as
procedural although it speaks of "the rights" of non-residents to resort to
the federal courts. See Note (1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 472.
98 18 F. (2d) 983 (E. D. Pa. 1927).
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the petition for an order directing such arbitration is filed." I'l
The court declared that "the proceedings may be brought in the
usual manner and jurisdiction over the arbitration assumed if
the arbitration provided for is to take place within the court's
jurisdiction; if not, then the proceedings shall be stayed until
the foreign arbitration is perfected, whereupon the court has
power to enter a decree upon the award." 100 Judge Coleman said:
"The language of these sections 10, makes it evident that the
intent of Congress was to change the existing rule and make
contracts for arbitration effectual.... (The holding in The Silver-
brook) seems erroneous under the broad language of section 3
granting that section 4 of the act limits the jurisdiction of the
court to order arbitration in connection with agreements per-
formable within the United States.... The express purpose of
the act is to deal with disputes in matters not merely of domestic,
but of foreign, business, commerce 'with foreign nations,' which
implies that the incident of such commerce which the act
validates-that is arbitration-occur in foreign places."1oI
(Italics ours).
We have seen that in the English cases involving the enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements, since the enactment of the
English Arbitration Act of 1889, the question of enforceability
has not been treated as procedural. There was no occasion for
their so doing in order to insure the application of the domestic
rule through employment of the conflict of laws rule that "the
lex fori determines questions of procedure." In American cases,
decided apart from modern arbitration statutes changing the
domestic rule of the forum, th device was, on the other hand,
quite commonly availed of to hold arbitration provisions inopera-
tive. Where the local rule of the forum, by statute or otherwise,
has sustained arbitration provisions, the rule that "the lex fori
determines questions of procedure" has not noticeably been called
upon. Now that statutes favoring arbitration are becoming
more general, it is to be expected that the application of this
rule with treatment of arbitration as "procedural" will become
less and less frequent. This use of the term and of the rule
seems to furnish a strong illustration that:
99 Danielsen v. Entre Rios, supra note 96, at 327.
100 Ibid. 327-328.
101 U. S. Arbitration Act 1925, §§ 2, 3; 43 STAT. 883 (1925), 9 U. S. C.
§§ 2, 3 (1926). Section 2 provides that "a written provision in any marl.
time transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commorce,
to settle by arbitration a controversy" etc. "shall be valid, irrevocable and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist . . . for revocation of any
contract." Section 3 provides that "if any suit or proceeding be brought
.... upon any issue referable to arbitration .... the court shall on appli.
cation ... stay the trial.., until such arbitration has been had in accord-
ance with the terms of the agreement .. ." (Italics ours).
102 Danielsen v. Entre Rios, supra note 96, at 328.
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"Behind the logical form (of judicial decision) lies a judg-
ment as to the relative worth and importance of competing
legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judg-
ment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of the whole
proceeding. You can give any conclusion a logical form." 1 0
los HOLIES, C0iax= LEGAL PAmEs (1921) 181. Cf. Dewey, Logical
Method and the Law (1924) 10 CORN. L. Q. 17, 21: "While the syllogism
sets forth the results of thinking, it has nothing to do with the operation
of thinking."
While the writer is solely responsible for the views expressed, he grate-
fully acknowledges his indebtedness to Professors Lorenzen and Sturges
for the help of their criticisms and his indebtedness to Profeisor W. W.
Cook for any usefulness that this article may have from the standpoint of
conflict of laws analysis.
